BOOK REVIEWS
CASES 'AND OTHER MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDnEE.

By Thomas E. At-

kinson and James H. Chadbourn. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc.,
1948. Pp. 910. $8.50.
A tittillating feature of this book is the "teachers' manual." According to
announcement, 1 the purpose of the manual is (1) "to indicate why certain
cases have been included, the reasons for which may, at first, seem obscure,"
and (2) "to offer comments on those cases which present special problems."
Not mentioned is (3) to provide the mentally flat-chested instructor a false
intellectual bosom.
Additional ways of slipping the instructor a few needed aces immediately
come to mind: A Dale Carnegie manual for the shy instructor; Joe Jackson's Joke Book for the humorless instructor; a du Barry course for the
ugly instructor. A look around at your colleagues may suggest other possibilities.
Exactly why this important information should be withheld from students
is not explained. This is especially puzzling in view of the many excellent
explanatory and introductory notes included in the casebook itself. The
reason may lie in a realistic recognition that the time lag between the publishers and the brief canneries is short, and the student may soon be equipped
with a type of assistance more adapted to his own peculiar needs. With
canned briefs for the students and canned intellect for the faculty, the casebook is reduced to the status of a legal fiction.?
A further interesting feature of the teachers' manual is that the instructor
is not initiated into its mysteries until after he has adopted the casebook, 3
except that "specimen pages

.

.

.

will be sent you in a few weeks."

Thus you will not really know what you, or rather your students, have
bought until after the fact.4 The sales method suggests the advisability of
sending the judge a box of good cigars at Christmas-time,
In some respects the book itself is outstandingly well done. The editors
have recognized that much of a student's study time is more or less wasted
because he does not know the point of view from which he ought to read a
case. To give direction to his preparation, some excellent introductory notes
have been used. The selection of cases and materials is, likewise, excellent
for the purpose intended.
On the other hand, the book is open to criticism in at least two respects.
It is overly ambitious, and its organization is archaic.
The compression of the whole of procedure, excepting evidence, within
the covers of a single volume and the confines of a single course is an exI Publisher's letter of March 15, 1949, to the trade.
2 "The influence of the fiction extends to every department of the jurist's activities." Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL.L.REv. 363 (1930).
3 See note 1 supra.

4 For many years the Cracker Jack Company, Chicago, Illinois, has sold a popular confection to children with great success on the basis of a surprise "toy or
novelty in each package to please and delight the children."
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traordinarily ambitious project. The book affords excellent material for a
survey course in procedure, but if you believe that the real difference between a lawyer and an intelligent layman lies in ability to appraise and operate machinery designed for the settlement of controversies, then you will
probably conclude that survey courses in procedure have no place in'the law
school. The book will give you a long ride through procedure but the rate
of speed will give slight opportunity for real acquaintance or critical evaluation en route.
The first hundred pages, combining cases and explanatory notes, contain
.byfar the best treatment of the forms of action at common law which has
appeared, although no mention is made, unfortunately, of the extrayet
ordinary
common-law remedies. A decent acquaintance with the commonlaw actions is essential to the literacy of a lawyer, yet the question may
be raised w;hether they ought to be taught in a course strictly labelled "Procedure." That the editors share this misgiving is indicated by their treatment of equitable remedies in twelve pages, with the explanation that consideration of equitable remedies "must be reserved for separate courses in
Equity and other substantive law courses." 5 Why the distinction between
legal and equitable remedies is not disclosed. The only apparent reason is a
champertous preservation of the separate course in equity.
Certainly some knowledge of common-law remedies ought to precede the
study of equity, but some knowledge of equity ought also to precede the
study of modem judicial administration of both legal and equitable remedies
in a single court. Effective dealing with problems arising from the union
of law and equity can scarcely be expected of intellectually one-legged students whose knowledge of equity is limited to twelve pages of exposure. A
preferable treatment ought to be to lump the development of remedies, both
legal and equitable, into a single introductory course, with emphasis upon
thehistorical parallel growth of both.
of remedies, despite the superb handling of common-law
The treatment
Iacti6ns,
indicates the
basic reluctance of the editors to undertake any critical
reappraisal or reorientation of the teaching of procedure. The old boundaries, have'been preserved as faithfully as any common-law judge ever insisted upon the maintenance of the boundaries between the actions. The
old courses have been refurbished and squeezed into a single volume, but
they are still the old courses.
The common-law actions have been included because traditionally they
have been regarded as procedural. Equity has substantially been omitted
because traditionally it has consisted of a strange group of materials arbitrarily handled in a separate course. Equity pleading classically has been a
procedure course, though a somewhat off-color one, and so is included, but
safely separated from pleading at law by some two hundred pages of intervening unrelated materials.
The treatment of pleading is highly compartmented. Judge Clark has
succeeded in giving the poor dog Pleading such a bad name that his friends
either rechristen him 6 or else hand him a very small bone out of the back
door. "Allthis has by no means eliminated the basic problems of formulating
5 P. 586. (Italics supplied.)
6 E.g., JEROMvE MICoAEL, THE ELEmENTs OF LEGAL CONTROVERSY (1948).
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issues and exchanging information in advance of trial, but it has required
that consideration go far beyond the mere question of what must be put
down on a piece of paper to be filed in court. The inquiry must include
summary judgments, pretrial conferences, discovery, demands .for adipissions, and all devices designed to accomplish the ends which pleading has
claimed but often failed to achieve. Some consideration ought also to be
given pleading as an effective method of getting lawyers to indulge in some
searching analytical thought about a case before it is reached for trial. The
materials are not adequate for these purposes.
Pleading in actions at law receives a total of one hundred seventy pages,
apportioned forty-eight pages to complaints, sixty-eight to answer and reply,
and fifty-four to demurrers and motions. Equity pleading is held in reserve
as a surprise until the student has been. taken entirely though an action at
law, with the chapters on pleadings at law being followed by chapters variously treating the right of jury trial, withdrawal from the jury, instructions,
verdicts, new trials, judgments, and review. Not until page 584 is equity
pleading reached. The twenty-four pages then devoted to the subject scarcely afford adequate recognition of the contributions of equity to modem
pleading and procedure. This organization discourages any comparative
approach, such as would be afforded by taking, for example, the problem
of stating a prima facie case in a complaint and tracing its treatment through
common law, equity, and codes down to the most recent developments as
exemplified by the Rules of the Municipal Court of Chicago and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Minor criticism might be made of the treatment of "Jurisdiction," as being limited to a consideration of the means of getting a defendant or a res
within the control of a court without consideration of what court. Jurisdiction of the subject matter is left to be treated in some nonprocedural
course, perhaps conflicts. Thus the possibility of helpful parallel handling is
again eliminated. The International Shoe case 7 is treated in a note 8 as
concerning only the problem of obtaining service on a foreign corporation,
while Hess v. Pawloski 9 appears under the separate heading "Other Forms
of Service." 10 This ideological separation fails to furnish any effective
hint that a new philosophy of jurisdiction of the person may be in course of
evolution.
A further example of the inadequacies of K-ration treatment is the space
devoted to instructing the jury. To the trial lawyer, probably no aspect
of litigation presents as much theoretical and practical difficulty as the instruction of the jury in the issues of the case and the principles to be applied in resolving them. At this stage counsel is called upon to put into
words many things, including some which he should have considered at the
pleading stage although perhaps not then required to give them formal utterance. The effective operation of the jury system generally and the avoidance of reversals in many jurisdictions require a high degree of precision
in analysis, with expression in language which is both understandable and
7 International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 Sup.Ct. 154, 903
L.Ed. 95 (1945).
8p. 168.
9 274 U.S. 352, 47 Sup.Ot. 632, 71 iL.Ed. 1091 (1927).
lOp. 180.
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legally accurate. The materials contained in eighteen pages are unlikely,
however thorough the documentation, to equip the student to cope with the
problem.
".. .u .a little pot, and soon hot" Il may be sufficient in areas where
the student needs only to become acquainted with enough landmarks to enable him later to undertake further exploration by himself when the occasion arises, but it is inadequate in dealing with the basic requirements of the
profession.
EDWAnD W. CLEARY.

University of Illinois.
Third Edition.
By Wilber G. Katz. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948.
Pp. 95.3 $2.50.
The burgeoning importance of accounting to lawyers has been so generally
acknowledged of late "that further argument on it is hardly necessary. The
fact is simply that the profession of accountancy is growing absolutely at
such an astounding rate that understanding of its functions and principles
must be part of the equiliment of anyone who would play an important and
constructive part in the functioning of our society whether as businessman,
public administrator, engineer, or legal counsellor. The importance of both
the legal and accounting professions has grown with the concentration of
economic endeavor and the ever widening ramifications of government, but
relatively the expansion in the accounting profession is far more startling.
In the two decades, 1920-1940, while the legal profession was expanding
47 per cent, the number of certified public accountants grew 347 per cent.
Since then the accountants' strength has again doubled to 32,000 or approximately 18 per cent of the number at the bar as compared with less than 5
per cent a generation ago.2
This quantitative importance alone would not justify devoting law students' time and efforts to accounting; for with a few well advertised exceptions most law schools do not undertake responsibility for instructing
their students in nuclear physics, electronics, and similar flourishing fields.
A far more cogent reason for training lawyers in accounting is the interdependence of the two professions and the necessary cooperation between
them in the solution of practical problems. Accountants have long recognized this, as witness the breadth of legal training that must be shown
to pass the CPA examinations. Far more sluggishly has the older profession recognized its dependence on the younger art. The lag has not been
necessarily disastrous, but it has without question contributed to the oftdiscussed decline in the prestige of the legal profession, particularly among
the managerial class.
Among the first to recognize the need to produce lawyers who were at
least housebroken in the realm of accounting and to act upon that need was

INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNTING FOR STUDENTS OF LAW.

11 The Taming of the Shrewo, Act IV, Scene 1. Compare Samuel Johnson, The
Rambler, June 6, 1751: "Praise like gold and diamonds owes its value only to its
scarcity."
I See discussion of format, supra.
2 Editorial, 86 J. AccouNTA2cy 353, 355 (1948); Swaine, The Impact of Big Busl.
ness on the Profession,35 A.B.A.J. 89, 92 (1949).
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Dean Katz and his early collaborator, Professor Willard J. Graham. Since
1932, when their Accounting in Law Practicefirst appeared, many approaches to this problem of teaching budding lawyers the elements of accounting
have been advanced and tested, but it is particularly interesting to observe
where such a persistent pioneer has arrived after nearly two decades of experimentation.
A casebook, unlike a text or a novel, cannot be reviewed in isolation. It
has no function other than as a classroom tool, and the reviewer necessarily
finds himself examining the course built around the book, or at least the
best course he thinks could be so based. Thus, at the outset a consideration
of the type of course that law students need may be ventured. Some schools
would settle for any old course given by the accounting or business or economics department of the university; others think the problem can be met
by outside reading, particularly from special texts; 3 a third group would
spice various courses with related dashes of accounting; and still others (including Harvard until 1949) would offer a'third-year elective on accounting
with emphasis on those portions most closely concerning law practitioners.
The radicals, including Chicago, Cornell, Duke, Harvard, Nebraska, and
Northwestern, have essentially decided two things: that a law school must
take responsibility for a certain minimum of accounting training for all its
students, and thaf this training must include an integrated basic course
specifically oriented to lawyers' needs and preferably given early enough
in the curriculum to enable teachers of business organizations, trusts, taxation, and regulation to consider the refinements of complex legal-accounting
questions in reliance on a firm grasp of accounting concepts and major techniques by all the students. It is not significant whether such a course is
separately organized and tagged as Accounting or is incorporated in the corporations course, as at Chicago, so long as it has a reasonable number of consecutive classroom hours. Chicago's 20-25 seem to me the absolute minimum, but Harvard's 32 are certainly reasonably comparable. In such a
condensed schedule only the most essential elements can be considered, and
many interesting inquiries into cost accounting, particularities of income
tax accounting, dividend statutes, treasury stock, etc., must necessarily be
deferred to later specialist courses.
There will normally be a large measure of agreement as to the ingredients
of the introductory accounting course. It must develop facility with elementary bookkeeping techniques, but not with complicated labor-saving systems.
It must give insight into the meaning of accrual accounting in its broadest
sense-the what and when of revenues, and the costs to be matched against
these in order to determine periodic net income. Specific cost problems involving inventories and fixed assets must be studied sufficiently so that the
student can at least distinguish alternative methods. Surplus and capital
account transactions and techniques of consolidation virtually complete the
list of what generally would be considered musts.
Less specific objectives seem to me to be equally vital: familiarity with
financial statements and schedules; ability to converse fluently in the language of accountancy and to grasp the full import of a journal entry; and
not the least, an acquaintance with the more frequent errors untrained courts
I E.g.,

Oehler, Accounting for Lawyers, P.L.I (1946).
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fall into when confronted with poorly presented accounting questions.
Against such criteria I shall attempt to appraise Dean Katz' book as a classroom aid.
In order to describe the contents and composition of the book, it is necessary to make certain quantitative adjustments because of the lack of uniformity in page size resulting from the use of photo-offset printing methods.
The book as a whole can be considered equivalent to approximately 150
pages of normal casebook typography. Of these, some forty-three consist
of exposition by the author of basic accounting methods with excellent
simple illustrations progressing in an orderly fashion from the elementary
accounting equation to common accrual questions. The author also deals
in his own manner with problems involving reserves and consolidated balance sheets. Some fifty pages are taken from Paton and Littleton, An Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards. From this well-known and
highly regarded work, Dean Katz has selected items from sections on the
basic concepts underlying accounting, allocation of revenue, and determination of income, and also disquisitions on inventory pricing and accounting
for plant. The next largest ingredient, which would equal about fifteen pages, consists of four of the American Institute of Accountants' recent bulletins, including the highly controversial ones on "Income and Earned Surplus" and "Depreciation and High Costs." The remainirig substantial components are Kimmel's excellent article on depreciation policy, an excerpt
from Walton Hamilton on cost as a standard for price, and one from Graham and Meredith's highly useful book on ratio analysis. Ten pages of
discount tables are also included. In summary then, we have approximately
one-third highly condensed text and illustration by the editor, one-third
erudite discussion by two of the accounting profession's leading authors, and
the balance a heterogeneous collection of composite authorities and economists' dabblings in the field of accountancy.
The author's exposition and problems are on the whole excellent, but some
of the former is so tight as to be pretty indigestible for the tyro. Three
times as many pages assigned from standard texts might well afford actual
saving in time. The explanation of consolidation technique (pp. 78-84) is
an example of this over-compression. I applaud his use of round numbers
in examples and problems; for one economy of students' time that is mandatory in law school accounting courses is the elimination of effort on pure
arithmetic. But all the problems are confined to testing mechanical ability,
none to exercising judgment, and this is to be regretted.
The Paton and Littleton component of the book is its greatest weakness,
not because those two authors are not among the most provocative and stimulating writers in the field, but because their discussions cannot be other than
bewildering and superficially absorbed by men who have never sunk their
teeth irito a few simple problems in recognition of revenues and matching
costs. In their Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards the distinguished authors were addressing the intelligentsia of the accounting profession in an attempt to state a general philosophy to which all could subscribe. For beginning students they just plain fly too high. What earthly
good does it do a beginner to follow the elaborate semantic by-play in which
they talk of costs cohering (p. 23) and come to the conclusion that the term
"price aggregate" is to be preferred to "cost." The inclusion of Paton and
2 ,OURNAL OF LEGAL EDNo.1
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Littleton's discussion of inventories (pp. 53-54) is unfortunate; for in this
area the authors are generally recognized to be more isolated from the general thinking of the profession than anywhere else. To expose a green student to their doctrinaire insistence on cost rather than lower-of-cost-ormarket and their intransigent rejection of "Lifo" without any discussion of
its merits seems pretty harsh.
The selection from Kimmel's Depreciation Policy and Postwar Expansion.is a splendid and convincing demonstration of the inadequacy of the accounting concept of depreciation on historical cost and of the necessity of
facing the issues raised by dilution of the monetary unit if we are not to expend our capital substance under the delightful illusion that the national income and productivity can go up and up while the tools available to the
workers wither away. Just why Walton Hamilton's Cost as a Standard for
Price should be thrown at students at this preliminary stage is a mystery.
This 1937 effort dealing largely with the Robinson-Patman Act hardly bears
out the editor's preface which asserts that specialized applications of accounting should be deferred to "the appropriate law course." Moreover,
the recent irrebuttable presumptions of infallibility with which the Supreme
Court has endowed the FTC make Hamilton's fears that the Commission
would be ensnared in the toils of controllers' figures at most a matter of
nostalgia. And in casting asparagus at accounting postulates and their inadequacy to provide all the answers to our complex industrial civilization, Hamilton betrays large gobs of ignorance as to the limits the accounting profession quite naturally sets for itself. If the following sentences display any
insight into accounting or anything else, the reviewer is too obtuse to detect
it: "Salaries, too, are rather price-made than price-making.

.

.

.

An

examination of a balance sheet will indicate the reflection of the profit and
loss account in executives' salaries." 4 It might be charitable to dismiss the
selection of this article as a waste of time with the comment that satire is
usually lost upon those readers who are not acquainted with the subject being satirized; but I feel that is not adequate. On page 21 cost accounting is
dismissed in one sentence as a "specialized field"; yet the last 9 per cent of
the book is devoted to Hamilton's raillery. It is as if a writer of American
history were to dismiss the age of Roosevelt as a complicated specialized
field and then incorporate a large chunk of Flynn's Country Squire in the
White House.
So much for what is in the book. Topics which will be missed include the
handling of bond discount and other problems of refunding debt capital,
with which many lawyers will be closely connected, consolidation except for
balance sheet techniques, and the handling of income taxes, particularly
when substantially affected by extraordinary charges or credits. But such
a complaint is trivial compared to the objection that must be taken to the
book's organization. There seems to be no theme running through the book;
it is not even an orderly medley. For example, the student faces a mature
discussion of depreciation on page 28, but not until page 39 does he receive
an elementary statement of depreciation reserves and charges. And if the
book is assigned to students in roughly even numbers of pages, one day will
be devoted to mechanical stuff and the next to a critique of pretty high4 P. 12.
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falutin theory rather than facing a concrete problem, discussing its theoretical implications, and working out practical solutions therefor.
The reviewer misses acutely reproductions of current financial statements,
SEC accounting releases, and administrative and judicial opinions, and feels
that this makes it difficult for the students to grapple with the subject of
accounting with the same interest and absorption which they bring to legal
problems through the case method in all its variations. I am afraid that a
student could gain a good mastery of the materials in this book and still be
pretty badly bewildered by the average company's financial statement or
particularly by any of the detailed schedules underlying it. Of course, it
may well be the practice of Chicago to furnish auxiliary materials to the
students to make up for this lack. As stated before, there are good problems
salted throughout the book, but they are utterly abstract in the sense that
the type of concern is not identified and all questions of judgment are eliminated; so the most they can contribute is mechanical proficiency, and not
development in the art of expressing financial and commercial events in the
language of dollars, which alone distinguishes the accounting profession
from the occupation of bookkeeping.
In no other area of law schools' responsibility are the possibilities of the
case system grander than in accounting. True, there are not too many
decisions of appellate courts that are useful except as exhibits in a chamber
of horrors, but that lack just emancipates the instructor and turns him loose
among the endless resources of administrative tribunals' opinions, Moody's
and Standard and Poor's reports, prospectuses, and pamphlets from Wall
Street banks and left-wing unions. The "case" or topic for discussion may
not be ready-made, but the ingredients are at hand in a way that is never
true of the average public or private law topic.
No teacher should turn his back on such an opportunity; and so if one
were to supplement Dean Katz' book with as much again of supporting and
contrasting illustrations from current accounting practice and a few decisions and were to pass over some of the more refined dogma, I would recommend the book as part of a balanced ration; but as it stands alone, it is to my
taste umble pie with some morsels tainted.
RoBERT AmonY, Jn.
Harvard University.
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION.

By Horace E. Read and
John W. MacDonald. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1948.
Pp. xlviii, 1357. $8.50.
A new casebook on Legislation edited by distinguished experts in this
field would be a great event even if more than two books for the use of
students had been published. The inclusion of a course devoted to legislation in the curricula of an ever increasing number of American law schools
is the best index for the growth and klan vital of written law in this country.
No longer is this source of law treated as a poor immigrant.
Hospitality, however, varies in degrees and kind, and so does the treatment given a department engaged in the discussion of the multifarious
problems created by legislated law.
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In 1931 Professor de Sloov&re published his casebook under the title
"Cases on the Interpretation of Statutes." As the name indicdted his concept of "legislation" centered around "methods, theories or principles by
which courts arrive at the meaning or effect of a statute." x According to
such a view, the significance of "legislation" as a teaching field must be
grasped from "what a statute will mean to the court of last resort in any
given case." 2 Teaching keyed to such an approach might successfully show
that "a narrow literalism too often defeated the purpose of remedial legislation," 3 and might, through the efforts of lawyers trained in a new spirit,
change the attitude of courts toward statute law. The real integration of
written law into the legal system points to its use as a prolific source for the
progress, of law through analogous application of its policy and of its rules.
A similar task was undertaken about the same time by Landis of Harvard. 4
Such a learned, not a mechanical, handling of legislation presents one of
the great modem problems which the future practitioner has to face. Consequently, the spade work should be done in the law schools, directing to this
question the attention of those who are the future interpreters of statutes.
It may be worth remembering that Justice (later Chief Justice) Stone could
write in 1937,
[that our] "law schools have begun to study and investigate the problem
involved in an adequate union of judge-made with statute law." 5
But shortly before this a new political philosophy had come to display
its practical side in a plethora of regulatory law. While the organization
of economic activities was previously founded upon private contracts, the
scope for free contracting has now become restricted, and the give and take
from which the action of the parties formerly derived its bearings has yielded
to prescriptions and proscriptions. No wonder draftsmen gained in stature,
honor, and income.
Years ago, which means in 1921, the final report of the Special Committee
on Legislative Drafting of the American Bar Association had expressed the
belief that a treatise on drafting does not compete with a treatise on construction. 6 Now the cry for another method to familiarize law students with
legislation, qualifying the task defined by Stone, found some echo. In 1940
when Frank Horack published his "Cases and Materials on Legislation" the
old thesis became dubious. Horack offered a book which was not only distinct for the originality of its approach and for the brilliance in its organization but also for its timeliness. As Horack remarked, there were numerous
published and unpublished materials dealing with the aspects of legislation
"in which constitutional law, administrative law, jurisprudence, and statutory interpretation were emphasized." 7 The main theme and keynote in
Horack's opus was different. No longer-should the discovery of legislative
I FREDERICK J. DE SLOOhVRE, OASES ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES SELECTED FRO.ME DECISIONS OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH COURTS (1931).

2 Ibid.
3 Stone, The Common Law in the UnitedZ States, 50 HA~v.L.REv. 4, 14 (1936).
4 J. M. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVsARD LEGAL ESSAYS
213 ff. (1934).
5 Stone, supra note 3 at 15.
GFor this point see 46 A.B.A.REP. 410, 412 (1921).
7 FRANK HOAC1K, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, Preface (1940).
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policy in a statute and its effect constitute the main subject of a course, but
rather the determination of a policy and its formulation in a draft appeared
to claim a paramount position in "legislation." He therefore gave ample
space in his book to other than legal materials for the purpose of illustratingthe reasons for a specific legislative action concerning such matters as gambling and regulations concerning the sale of milk or safety in the construction of buildings.
Whether the inclusion of such materials in a casebook lends itself to its
recurrent use, year by year, as is true of other materials, remains a question.
But the shifting of emphasis so strongly pleaded by Horack occurred in a
time very appreciative of such a change. The war gave a great many lawyers, who were professors, present and future, ample opportunity intra
muros (of Washington) et extra, to engage in drafting of regulations.
With all due reservation against typifying of casebooks, the book under
review seems to fit into the last mentioned class rather than into another
type.' But, in any case, any appraisal of an outstanding book calls for an
exposition of its contents.
Chapter 1 deals with "Some Comparative Aspects of the Growth of Law
Through the Judicial and Legislative Process." There is no discussion of
comparative law, but a reader is given abundant opportunity of delving into
a wide compilation which deals especially with stare-decisis and changes in
judicial interpretations of statutes. Two famous cases are presented also,
under the title "Unprecedented Law Making." 9 The choice of the word
law making is not a happy one, if restricted to cases of judicial empiricism
alone. The use of the expression is explainable however if the tasks which
turn upon the effectuation of a policy expressed in or read into a statute are
relegated to second place. The question of a justification of such a relegation will be discussed later.
Moreover, the editors allot much space to the Statute of Uses and the Statute of Frauds, to New York cases on sealed instruments and related matters,
and to foreign motorists' statutes. Aside from the latter, used as an illustration for "legislative precedents," the three former topics are offered as
examples for "law-reforming statutes" and "legislation in aid of the courts."
From an educational point of view, one may approve of such an incorporation if one has doubts whether students, who have gone through a full sized
course in torts, trusts, and personal property, and possibly conflict of laws
and constitutional law,10 have not become sufficiently familiar with the historical, legal, economic, and social considerations underlying those statutes.
In my experience the real difficulties originate in the specific normative
problems. The topic of "legislative precedents" is not alien to them and a
short reference will recall to their memory what for instance they have
heard about the pattern set by Field's Code of Procedure.
8 See, e.g., for the other type, N. T. DOWLING, EDWIN W. PATTERSON, AND RienArD R. POWELL, MNATERIALS FOR LEGAL IETHOD 276 ft. (1946). See also HarIy W.
Jones, Note8 on the Teaching of Legal Method, 1 J.LEGAL ED. 13, 25 (1948), for the
emphasis on extrinsic-aids cases for the purpose of introducing law students in the
field of legislation.
9 Oppenhelim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923), and Daily v. Parker, V52
F.2d 174 (C.C.A.7th 1945).
10 Preface vii.
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Chapter 2 deals with legislative organization and procedure in a very detailed manner.
The same is true of Chapter 3, entitled "Types of Statutes." Many types
are well covered; but the great problem of the "conflict of statutes in time"
involving the "big" questions of retroactivity is hardly touched. (Not even
the word retroactivity can be found in the Index; it is mentioned on pages
.355-356.) One aspect of curative legislation can be seen from the Cannon
.Case (pp. 357-362) and another from McCleary v. Babcock (p. 378). On
this score I raise a doubt. There is hardly any other subject which engages
.a practitioner's acumen and time more than questions about the application
of a new law of this type. Quite a few of such questions, as for example the
Portal-to-Portal issues, have even made headlines.
The heading of section three in this chapter is "Creative Legislation."
The section consists of obiter dicta taken from a Michigan case of 1888, 1
-about the ancient background of "adoption." Looking up the Michigan case,
I found that the decision went off on a mere construction of a will. This is
followed by three paragraphs from an article, rejecting the rather notorious
fact that "adoption" itself is a brain child of Roman law, from which it was
taken over in other countries. In so far as the utilization of ancient learning for a better understanding of our statutory domestic relations law is
concerned, scholars will disagree with that rejection.' 2
Examining the plea for classification, a demurrer must be sustained; for
if one applies the editors' definition of "creative statutes," all modem labor,
tax, social insurance, and immigration law (if we disregard written constitutions) could claim such distinction, and what would be left outside the
"class" is certainly of lesser significance in the practice of law.
Chapter 4 compiles, in nearly 300 pages, material on sanctions, in general,
and, in particular, on penalties, contempt, invalidation and disabilities, adverse presumptions, civil liabilities, and requirement of oath and of bond,
and finally even material on the administrative process. In assembling such
an impressive body of, for the greatest part, secondary material, the book
has no rival. An inquiry into the usefulness of such a proceeding commences with the question whether courses on contracts, procedure, evidence,
:and administrative law do not pass on sufficient information; but answers
to the question of what choice among the various classes of sanctions should
be made in a legislative-drafting problem at hand, can hardly be found by a
,draftsman "in any legislative manual nor in the work of great legislative
draftsmen."'13 If, however, for example I should decide to tulr to the
problem of constitutionality of statutory "adverse presumptions" in a course
on Legislation, I believe that I would rather refer to Western & Atlantic R.
R. v. Henderson.1 4 But since, for long, the rationality test has been recog11 In re Session's Estate, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N.W. 249 (1888).
12 Only one example, a scientific investigation will prove that the statutory word
fraud in marriage statutes draws its meaning in England and in many other states
(not in New York) from the Canonistic doctrine of "erorin, persona." See C.I.S.
1083, § 1, and Moss v. Moss, [18971 P. 263.
13 Words used by Mr. Justice Frankfurter (with reference to another difficult
drafting problem) in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 526, 68 Sup.Ot. 665, 675,
92 L.Ed. 840 (1948).
'4 279 U.S. 639, 49 Sup.0t. 445, 73 L.Ed. 884 (1929).
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nized as the correct approach to the problem, the educational purpose, if any,
of embracing such presumptions would be served better by a reference to
new legislative discoveries in this field than by the rehash of well settledtopics.15
Concerning the extent of the use to be made of administrative processes,
this had been argued in principle for years. Cases on subordinate legislation
and law making through administrative agencies and professional tribunals
could have asserted a better claim for more space than secondary material
concerning problems, greatly laid at rest by the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. Finally the immense employment of quotations impresses on the
reader, at times with persuasive force, the truism that often less may be
better than more. Thus, this reviewer would decisively give preference to
Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter's stimulating dissent in United States v.
Monia 6 to Mr. Jennings' (Tennessee) quotations from Mr. Westbrook
Pegler's misunderstandings of this dissent.17
Section 13 in this chapter contains material on licensing and inspection,
section 14 on publicity (as a protective device), and section 15 on other preventive measures. As for licensing, one way to look at it is from the standpoint of a draftsman. But, for the practitioner, might not the question of
judicial review be of greater interest? True, licensing is also a medium of
prevention, but its regulatory aspect ranks it more closely to problems of administrative interpretation and, where renewal is at issue, to those of adjudication.
Chapter 5 includes material pertaining to ancient and modern sources
dealing with the "form of law making" and "the parts of a statute." In section 9 on "clause as to taking effect," the reader encounters, at last, cases
which show glimpses of the importance of the time element in a world of
changes, including those in statutory law.
With Chapter 6 "Legislative Language, its Arrangement and the Mechanics of Drafting," the editors reach the interpretative part of the teaching subject. Chapters 7 and 8 of the book also deal chiefly with problems
of interpretation.
Chapter 7 embraces the material under the title "The Methods of Interpretation and Construction" and Chapter 8 under the designation "Fitting
Legislation into a Unified Legal System." The latter title is somewhat misleading. On the one hand, there are many who think that the relationship of common law concepts and rules and of statutory tenets is not coextensive with the four corners of a legal system. On the other hand, any
application of law as such presupposes the unity of a legal system, or order,
not a dis-order. Antinomies arise within the sphere of judge-made law as
well as within that of written law; and, therefore, also between the latter and
15A nice example is now supplied by N. Y. OPA § 1444a creating a cause of
action for damages in favor of a tenant against his landlord; the action lies where
the latter, having succeeded in removal of the former through an eviction proceeding, fails to occupy within 30 days or to rent within one year the housing
accommodation.
16 317 U.S. 424, 63 Sup.Ct. 409, 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943).
17 Pp. 597-598. An editors' note referring to the Monia case, supra, would have
been helpful to students ignorant of the source from which the "quotations" are
taken.
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the former. Questions of adjustment of new law to the old permeate the
process of policy making at every stage, particularly, however, at the formative one. 18
With this light touch of skepticism on a picture only imperfectly reflecting
-the abundant contents of the book, the discussion may broaden to one on
matters of approach
The book brings into a sharp focus first a segregation between legislative
language and methods of interpretation; and then between the latter and, the
labor of avoiding incongruities within the same legal system. We may
ask: Is such division methodically right?
Teaching "legislation" one ought to readily lay hands on the inter-relationship between the legislative process and that of interpretation as well as on
the interconnection between the various components in the legal organization. Why not introduce the student to the various categories of "norms"
before going into matters of legislative process and interpretation? A reference to the legal nature of collective bargaining contracts would demonstrate
the wide use made by legislatures of policies formulated by private groups
only. All the easier it then becomes to explain the organizational interconnection between the formulation of a policy in the legislative process and that
in the process of application.
Parallelisms between judicial activities in this respect and those of administrative agencies and tribunals cannot be grasped by too much emphasis
on the old techniques, developed in a period of literalism. 19 Indefiniteness of
expression (see title to subsection C, p. 852) is one thing, but it is an entirely different question whether the expanding activity of administrative
agencies, that is the effectuation of legislative policy through law making in
its particularization through such agencies, should be approached as a
linguistic problem. Majority and minority in PanamaRefining Co. v. Ryan
agreed that the expressions used in the N.I.R.A. were definite enough so as
to leave the executive no choice whatsoever as to the means, viz. an oil embargo. 20 There was no discord between the two groups that the Act had
sharply defined and confined what might otherwise be done administratively
under the legislation. 21 Majority and minority differed solely on the question whether the Act had provided for sufficient safeguards against the
executive's unwise or improper determination as to the occasion when he
should proclaim an oil embargo. 22
Legislation is one method of law-making, and the translation of a policy,
expressed in general terms (if not in abstracts) or not literally expressed
at all and therefore being a matter of inferences and opinions, into concreteness, is another. The criterion for constitutionality of the latter method can
not be found among the "problems of language," 2 3 but rather among the
18 BENJAMIN N. CARD0oZ, TnE PAR.ADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 2 (1928).
19 See Preface vii (lines 2, 26) speaking of "methods of the legislative
.
and the judicial techniques of applying the statutes

process

20 See Justice Cardozo's dissent, 293 U.S. 388, 433, 435, 55 Sup.Ct. 241, 254, 79
L.Ed. 446, 466 (1935).
21 CA.RL MCFARLAND
MINISTRATIVE LAW

AND A-RTHU

T. VANDERBILT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON A.D-

309 (1947).

22 WALTER GELLIORN, ADMnISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COlMENTS

264 n. (1040).

23 Title to section 2 covering delegated law making by administrative agencies.
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requirements for
fairness and justice, varying with the particular needs and
24

circumstances.

The very nature of the method by which government in its judicial and
executive branches deals with enactments created by its legislative branch is
a matter of daily experience, whenever the wording of a statute lends support
to reading into it more than one meaning.
Few words are so plain that the context or the occasrion is without capacity to enlarge or narrow their extension. The tlLouglkt behind the
phrase proclaims itself misread when the outcome of the reading is injustice or absurdity.25
No doubt, a case worth litigating offers to either side in the litigation
equally good "canons" and other traditional legal ammunition. Counsel
whose interpretative method-e.g. an in-pari-materiaconstruction-can enlist a stronger appeal to extra-legal factors such as soundness of the result and its justice, decency, moral sentiments, and consistency with fundamental tenets of our political and economical philosophy, than those which
lie in the unius-expressio construction of his opponent, will throw the balance in favor of his client.2 6
In other words, policy making is not restricted to legislating. The latter
job compares with that of drawing up blueprints for manufacturing new
kinds of products. But shape and quality of the product depend upon the
work in the machine shop and on the assembly line. Only a few of the
students are likely to become engaged in policy making of the blueprint pattern, for most of them will operate in the shop and assembly line stages,
which means practicing law. A course on legislation offers one of the best
opportunities for instruction for students in a very important sector of
advocacy. It was justice Holmes who observed that the judges legislate
(we would fain say make law) "whenever they determine which of two competing principles of policy shall prevail." 27 Counsel's role in that work
in following each clue of "policy" and bringing all its ingredients to the
fore so that they may inspire that judicial determination, is too obvious to
require a more detailed description.
Certainly we law teachers need not all travel on the same road. But one
approach to the temple consecrated to advocatory wisdom might be paved
by those who believe that broader room should be given in class discussion
to policy considerations which might determine effect and meaning of a statute rather than to those which make its drafting intelligible. Only fourteen
24 Cf. Freund, T'he Emergency Price Control Act of 1942: Constitutional Issces,
9 LAw & CONTErm.PRoB3. 77 (1942).
25 Gardozo, 0.3., in Surace v. Danna, 248 N.Y. 18, 21, 161 N.E. 315 (1928). (Italics

supplied.)
26 See Llewellyn, The Moderz Approach to Counselling and Advocacy-Esperially
in Commercial Transactions,46 CoL.L.REv. 167, 182 (1946), speaking of a case made
equally perfect from the view of legal correctness, on either side: "The struggle
will then be for acceptance by the tribunal of the one technically perfect view of the
law as against the other. Acceptance will turn on something beyond 'legal correctness.' It ought to."
27 Holmes, J., concurring in Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands,
277 U.S. 189, 210, 48 Sup.Ct. 480, 485, 72 L.Ed. 845, 852--853 (1928).

1949]

BOOK REVIEWS

years ago, Dean Roscoe Pound noted that handling of legislative texts is
the weakest point in our common law technique of decision.28
Unfortunately, this seems to me to be still true today. I have found, also,
that students of the second or third year meet with significantly fewer difficulties in understanding the interplays preliminary to the passage of an act
than they face when (more or less covered behind artful bandying of juristic dialectics) conflicting interests, public and private alike, call for careful
analysis.
The stimulating force which a consideration of competing interpretations
entails can hardly be exceeded by any other class discussion. But our classrooms are not teaming with Herculeses who prefer stimulating difficulties to
easy-going expositions. For this reason students side usually with those
opinions which reach meaning by giving a case a literalistic or technical
treatment. So it comes that there are a great many occasions when one has
alert students if they are not to identify the best counsel as a hybrid, a union
of a master of "canons" and a grammarian.
Let it be well understood, however, that to point to the potent agencies
and currents which place interpretative reasoning alongside legislative considerations, is not by any means to intimate that the present volume fails in
presenting material also for this aspect of interpretation. A mere glance
at the book would disclose the faultiness of such an intimation. On the contrary. Reading the book, one is impressed by the laudable effort to place
into equal prominence many lines of thinking. In this connection it may
properly be said that as a reference book the volume cannot be equaled.
It is nearly a storehouse of learning. I counted about 160 fragments selected
from so many texts of writers or other materials, apart from cases, representing all possible ideologies in the field of legislation (for purpose of this
computation I even disregarded the innumerable quotations from writings
which can be found in the notes). Moreover, the book contains a wealth of
bibliographical information and of references to case material. Propounding
thus the diversified views of other people, the editors went perhaps too far
in refraining from writing any comments or explanatory notes themselves.
In the voluminous book one finds very rarely any intervention on the part
of the editors, and if they intersperse a few lines, such remarks have, with
few exceptions, an editorial rather than an analytical character.2 9 Questions
of methods of teaching and presentation of material lie beyond a reviewer's
jurisdiction. After the foregoing discussion the reader suspects that su'ch
questions may be called matters of policy. Every teacher has a different
opinion regarding the policy of teaching legislation; thus, at this writing
some fifty odd policies may have developed. Whatever another may think
of the type of a casebook, it seems to be clear that the reviewer's personal
preferences for another type is entirely unimportant quoad reviewing. Every
editor is entitled to be guided by his own ideas, e.g. about the question
whether the main body of a volume, 30aside from the cases, should be gathered
from excerpts, or written by himself.
28 In his review of A. L. Goodhard, Precedent in English and Continental Law,
48 HAnv.L.REv. 863, 867 (1935).
29 E.g., on pp. 21, 52, 141, 238, 355, 375, 377, 462, 704, 764, 798, 865, 972, 975, 1015,
1024, 1041, 1077, 1108, 1176, and 1274.
30 For this alternative see Llewellyn, On the Problem of Teaching "Private"Law,
54 H~nv.L.REV. 775, 801 if. (1941).
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But the volume, by the multitude of topic-headings, classifications, and allocations, indicates certain approaches to problems of legislation itself. For
instance, it treats unius expressio construction as a canon. The incidents of
an interpretative approach determine the result. Were expressio unius
nothing more than a canon of which there are many, any reviewer would be
satisfied. In reality, the negative inversion is a method of construction, and
expressio unius and argumentum a contrario serve as the most notorious
examples of its application. Their immense success is a test case for mental
inertia. Most procedural technicalities, for instance, result from reading
a negative-opposite into a rule or precept. With the progress of statutory
law, the domain subject to all the fallacies inherent in that construction has
greatly increased. 31 Being served with so many dishes from other compartments, one is struck by the frugality encountered in this cuisine. There
is only one case included in the volume; and not even one single excerpt
from other writings is added.
Some attention is given to statutory analogy, the counterpart, in juristic
logic, of the negative-opposite construction. But even so, only a back-seat is
assigned to it (p. 1268 ff.). One finds a very short quotation from Landis'
famous study, z and another from a sort of primer on German Civil Law
by Schuster,m besides three cases only one of, which, the Keifer case,34
might claim representative rank. The most important results pointed out
by Landis are, therefore, not presented. Cardozo's provocative writings are
not referred to, nor are any of his cases, in which he resorted to statutory
analogy, and explained its importance. Certainly, the few cases included in
the volume do not prove so broad a statement as that "in numerous other
cases the courts have reasoned by analogy from statutes which were not
necessarily determinative of their decisions" (p. 1274). Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in United States v. Hutcheson,35 to mention one of the
recent cases, does not exemplify the editors' remark. Moreover, they seem
themselves to feel the close resemblance, if not affinity of souls, between
analogy and in-pari-materia(p. 1077, Note 3).
Does the editors' attitude towards analogy account for the inclusion of
Schuster's animadversions on its use? Even disregarding the fact that no
continental legal scholar (not to speak of bench and bar) has ever set any
store by them, Schuster's pronouncement (p. 1269) that statutory analogy
"'assumes that the omission" (in one statutory provision) "was iccidental,
while it may have been deliberate," (and yet extends the rule of another provision to that gap) is baseless. The contrary is true. Where the interpreter
finds that the omission was intended, the existence of a gap is denied and
the way to analogy is therefore barred, for where the legislature attributed
significance to a fact, the absence of such a fact in the case at hand pre31For details see this reviewer's article, Ewtra-LegislationaZ Progress of Law:
The Place of the Judiciary in the Shaping of New Law, 28 NEB.L.BULL. 542 (194D).
32 Landis, Statutes and the Hources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAyS 213 ff.
(1934).
33 ERINEST J. ScHUSTER, THE PRinI'LEs OF GExRMAx CrVIL LAW (1907).
'34Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U.S. 381, 59 Sup.

Ct. 516, 83 L.Ed. 784 (1939).
35312 U.S. 219, 227, 61 Sup.Ct 463, 464, 85 L.Ed. 788, 790 (1941).
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cludes the application of the legislative rule to the case. 36 Schuster's remarks, however, on "English methods of interpretation" are at least on this
side of the Atlantic obsolete, and seem in our days like the frozen sounds of
Miinchhausen's trumpet. By way of contrast, the place given to Johnson v.
United States 3 -- in the note preceding the Keifer case-suggests the editors' belief that Justice Holmes formed his decision in concepts of analogy.
What he did was to stay within the boundaries of the statute. He reached
the result simply through an extensive interpretation,which means by adoption of the scope of a statutory provision to its very purpose where the too
narrow statutory language was incongruent with the legislative objective.
It would be too pedantic indeed to place the accent upon mild divergencies
between the editors' approaches and those preferred by the reviewer. For
every reader will agree with this writer in paying tribute to the authors for
the admirable presentation of a subject which seems to baffle traditional
organization. The real test for the value of a casebook lies in its usefulness
in and outside of the classroom. That the book, embracing more than two
hundred cases in the text and countless other cases in annotations, meets this
test more than adequately can be seen from the foregoing appraisal.
A topical index, a table of periodical and text materials, and a table of
cases facilitate quick orientation in any subject matter.
To sum up, Read and MacDonald's book represents one of the great
scholarly contributions offered by the academic branch of the legal profession to the student of legislation.
ARTHiuIR LENHOFFP.

University of Buffalo.
LAw OF CORPORATIONS. By Robert S.
Stevens and Arthur Larson. St. Paul: West Publishing Company,
1947. Pp. xxxi, 1200. $8.00.
This casebook offers to the teacher of the basic introductory course in corporation law a new collection of materials that should prove useful and
stimulating. The authors have selected carefully many of the best recent
cases and have made innovations in organization that are promising. To
start with the final chapter as an example of the latter, the arrangement of
materials on shareholders' suits is outstanding. The authors utilized as a
frame of reference excerpts from the contrasting views expressed by Wood 1
in the Chamber of Commerce Report and by Hornstein 2 in the law reviews
with regard to the controversial New York legislation. This sharpens the
issues that are presented in the accompanying statutes and cases. The result is the most satisfactory treatment of the subject that I have seen. Other
aspects that I like particularly are the grouping together of materials on
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE

36 See, for instance, 0. Piski, in I KLANG, KOxn1ENTAR ZUM ALLGEdmINEN BURRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH 139 (1St ed. 1933).
37 163 Fed. 30 (C.C.A.lst 1908).
i FRANKLIN S. WOOD, SURVEY AZND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATrvE SurrS (prepared for the Special Committee on Corporate Litigation, Cham-

ber of Commerce of the State of New York, 1944).

2 Hornstein, The Death Knelt of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York,
32 CALIr.L.REV. 123 (1944). See also, Hornstein, New Aspects of StockIolders' De.
rivative Suits, 47 CoL.L.REV. 1 (1947).
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problems of control, the introduction of more advanced topics, such as preferred shares, in conjunction with basic concepts, the use of SEC opinions
in connection with specific problems rather than as a separate section, and
the editorial notes which are frequently employed to point out other facets
of a particular subject.
The order of presentation is familiar, and susceptible to rearrangement
in accordance with the preferences of the individual instructor. After a
brief introduction, various aspects of corporate personality are considered.
The chapter on "Disregarding the Corporate Fiction" might well have included the Consolidated Rock Products3 and Deep Rock 4 cases despite their
difficulty. There are some useful materials on the formation of a corporation, the "de facto" doctrine, and pre-incorporation agreements. The "Structure of Corporation Management" has many good features but doesn't seem
to me to have developed sufficiently the various questions relating to the
authority of officers. The de-emphasis of ultra vires is welcome, but the
cases on the tort and criminal aspects of this subject could have been omitted.
The following chapter on "Problems of Control" groups the materials on
this important question in an effective fashion. Thus, the proxy section explores the extensive ramifications of this subject in the courts and the SEC.
Similarly, the section on voting trusts is noteworthy for its thorough treatment of problems other than the conventional doctrinal controversy. Both
sections enable the teacher to develop the many practical and policy issues
that are involved. Other sections deal with agreements as to control, cumulative voting, and non-voting shares. "Managerial Duties of Care and Skill"
includes some good recent cases but I believe that it suffers by the omission
of some of the old favorites which were especially useful for teaching
purposes. The chapter entitled "Fiduciary Duties of Management" contains
a good cross-section of the newer decisions coupled with the best of the older
landmarks.
The subject of "Acquiring Assets for the Corporate Business" comprises,
inter alia, a comparison of the legal attributes of different types of securities,
and the rights and duties of promoters and shareholders with respect to
capital maintenance, including the doctrines of equitable contribution and
preemptive rights. The section on types of securities is provocative but attempts too much in dealing with the tax aspects of "hybrid" securities, and
questions such as the "negative pledge" and "no recourse" clauses in bonds
and debentures. My own experience has been that the average law student
who lacks a background in accounting needs more intensive training in the
fundamentals of a capital structure. Consequently, I would postpone these
more advanced problems to a second course. In the section on shareholders'
liability, one finds most of the familiar cases, but I should have preferred a
more distinct treatment of no-par shares, which experience has shown to be
a difficult topic to teach. Some text material would have been helpful in
3

Consolidated Rock Products Company v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 61 Sup.Ct. 675,

S5 L.Ed. 982 (1941).

4 Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Company, 306 U.S. 307, 59 Sup.Ct. 543, 83 L.
Ed. 669 (1939).
5 It can now be supplemented by the New Yorker profile of Lewis Dusenbery
Gilbert. See Bainbridge, The Talking Stockholder, The New Yorker, Dec. 11, 19,18,
p. 40, and Dec. 18, 1948, p. 33.
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showing the relation between liability for issuance and for balance sheet
presentation,
The subject of dividends is a major one in any basic corporation course,
and the authors have presented a rich variety of material. My own view
is that it would have been advisable to concentrate more attention on the
question of what "funds" are available for dividends and somewhat less on
the problem of the shareholder's right to a dividend. The section on special
problems of distribution includes Helvering v. Griffiths,6 followed by a long
note on the taxation of dividends, which takes time and space for a difficult
topic that might better have been left to the course in taxation. The con-'
cluding section on a corporation's right to purchase its own shares is very
brief. The relation of these cases to other aspects of the maintenance of
capital warrants greater attention to the accounting and legal considerations
involved than the authors have given.
The presentation of the topic "Right to Inspection and Information" is
thorough, and includes the recent cases on the question of the rights of holders of voting trust certificates. The chapter entitled "Duty of Majority
toward Minority in Making Fundamental Changes" introduces effectively the
difficult questions of fiduciary responsibility raised by transactions involving
either sale of corporate assets, dissolution, merger, consolidation, redemption,
or recapitalization. The editorial note comparing recapitalization with reorganization enables the instructor to stress the contrasting standards that
have been applied without the necessity of going too far into the complexities
of reorganization legislation. I believe that this advanced material belongs
in the introductory course, and the authors have brought it within a manageable compass. The final chapter on shareholders' suits has been mentioned previously. As a matter of organization, I believe the topic should be
introduced earlier in the course, preferably before the cases involving the
substantive duties of directors and management.
A final word on the use of statutory material may be permitted. The
Delaware and New York provisions are frequently reprinted in connection
with specific topics, and there is occasional reference to the statutes of other
states. Some opinions of the SEC rendered in Public Utility Holding Company Act cases provide an opportunity to study the contradictory trends in
state and federal legislation. Nonetheless, I feel a greater use of such material would have been desirable. This suggestion stems from my strong conviction that "corporations" properly taught should include an intensive study
of the "public" aspects of the subject. This approach requires an analysis of
the legislative changes within and between states, as well as an exploration
of the reasons underlying the distinct developments in federal legislation.
But this difference in emphasis should not obscure my appreciation of the
fine collection of materials for a basic course that the authors have given us.
BRuNsox MACCHESNEY

Wforthwestern University.
6 318 U.S. 371, 63 Sup.Ot. 636, 87 L.Ed. 843 {1943).

I doubt the wisdom of in-

duading so many tax cases throughout the book. The material on diversity jurisdiction, commercial domicile, and apportionment of dividends between life tenant
ond remainderman might also have been left to other courses.
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Second Edition. By Paul W.
St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1948. Pp. xxv, 976.

CASES AND MATERALS ON TA-xATiON.

Bruton.

$9.00.
According to the announcement accompanying the second edition of Professor Bruton's book: "In addition to being up to date it is a completely
new presentation. Nearly two-thirds of the material is new and appears in
Bruton's case book for the first time."
The reviewer has no quarrel with the publisher's statistics. Without undertaking a critical count, it looks as though at least two-thirds of the material
in the second edition of Bruton's book is new. Events move rapidly in the
tax field. A good many cases have been decided since the first edition of
Bruton's book in 1941. There have.been radical and far-reaching revisions
of the federal tax statutes. The new edition catches these changes down
through the 1948 Act.'
The "comnpletely new presentation" consists of an increased emphasis on
federal taxation and a corresponding decrease in the space devoted to state
taxation. It might have been better if Mr. Bruton had gone even further
along these lines, and with the exception of the material on state death taxes,
deleted the cases on state taxation entirely.
The most significant change in Bruton's treatment of state taxes is the
elimination of the cases on interstate commerce. In the author's own words:
"State corporation taxes certainly present the lawyer with formidable and
important problems. But the complexity and diversity of the various state
statutes tend to reduce any general study to a consideration of constitutional
issues which in my opinion can more profitably be left to constitutional law
cotises."2
It is difficult to see why the same comment could not be applied
with equal
force to a good deal of the author's other material. The cases on state jurisdiction to tax, for example, fall fairly within the scope of a course on constitutional law or conflict of laws. They are, moreover, practically unintelligible except in connection with a consideration of the commerce clause, since
basically both jurisdiction to tax and the immunity of interstate commerce
from state taxation stem from the same fundamental problem of multiple
state taxation. One of the most interesting recent cases on jurisdiction to
tax in Mr. Bruton's book, for example, is Northwest Airlines v. State of
Minnesota (p. 66) which involves the taxation of airplanes engaged in interstate commerce. It is certainly difficult to consider this case realistically as
a problem in due process divorced from the commerce clause.
A course on state taxation, which is not confined to a particular jurisdiction, inevitably deteriorates into a "consideration of constitutional issues"
or a superficial sampling of the particular tax statutes of the various states.
There is no other direction in which it can go. It seems wiser to limit the
' The 1949 revision of Professor Bruton's book includes the recent decisions In
Commissioner v. Church's Estate, 335 U.S. 632; Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner,
335 U.S. 701; Commissioner v. Phipps, 336 U.S. 410; and Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, all of which were decided in 1949. Apart from these additions,
however, the second edition of the book does not seem to have been substantially
changed by the 1949 revision.
2 Preface, ix.
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basic law school course to federal taxes, with some incidental reference to
similar state taxes, and to let constitutional law and conflict of laws take
care of their own.
The only common ground between state and federal taxation is the common
noun. They came together through sheer expediency rather than any logical
nexus and it is past time for the dissolution of their unnatural union. It
will probably seem incredible to the younger tax teacher struggling to condense the ever expanding law of the federal income, estate and gift taxes into
the time allotted to taxation in most schools, that the reason that the material on constitutional law and conflict of laws was originally imported into the
course on taxation was that there was not enough on federal taxes to furnish
the foundation for an independent course. Harvard was one of the first
schools to give a course on taxation and the responsibility for the course
fell to the late Professor Joseph Beale. Mr. Beale was an admirable teacher
and a great authority on conflict of laws. Just as the true tax teacher to-day
visualizes the law school curriculum as a sort of minor adjunct to taxation,
so Mr. Beale saw most of the law as subsidiary to conflict of laws. When
he was called upon to teach taxation he lifted the section on jurisdiction to
tax from his conflict of laws casebook, added a few constitutional law decisions, and with the aid of the then meager federal statutes and regulations on
the income and estate taxes proceeded to put together a course on taxation.
Taxation will always be indebted to Professor Beale for his pioneering
vision. However, there is no reason why it should remain forever wedded
to the pattern in which he originally worked out the course, particularly
when the reasons which led to that pattern are no longer operative.
Although Mr. Bruton's book would be a better integrated book with the
omission of the preliminary chapters on constitutional law, in one place he
has made admirable use of certain state tax cases, which are really tax cases
rather than cases on federal constitutional law. Most state income taxes are a
reasonable facsimile of the federal law. The student who is well grounded
in the federal statute will, therefore, usually experience little difficulty in
dealing with the problems which arise under a state income tax. It is impossible, however, to give any clear picture of state death taxation by a consideration limited to the federal estate tax, simply because the federal estate
tax is an estate tax, while most of the state death taxes are inheritance taxes.
In his treatment of the federal estate and gift taxes, Mr. Bruton has intro-,
duced decisions on state death taxes, to point up the differences between an
estate tax and an inheritance tax, and to illustrate some of the principal -problems which arise in connection with state death taxes. Although it is open
to doubt whether anything except confusion is gained by the author's attempt to combine death and gift taxes, his judicious selection of state death

tax cases, not only gives a good glimpse of these taxes, but also throws light
on various problems connected with the federal estate tax itself, such as
the credit allowed against the basic federal tax for state taxes, and the question of what part of the taxable estate actually bears the burden of the

federal tax.
Criticism of Professor Bruton's book on the"score that it introduces a good
deal of extraneous constitutional law questions into a good casebook on federal taxation, loses much of its force in the light of the fact that the author
has produced a very good casebook on that topic. His treatment of the fed2 ,TOUR;AL OF LEGAL ED.NO.1-9
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eral income, estate and gift taxes is as complete as any in the field. There
is ample material here for a good basic course in federal taxation and nothing
at all to prevent the instructor from omitting the preliminary chapters on constitutional law.
The material on federal taxation is edited excellently. The cases are well
chosen and interesting. For the most part they are not only current cases,
but cases dealing with current problems. Necessary background and historical material is supplied by a series of excellent text statements and judicious
selections from Committee Reports. There is an appendix describing the
procedure in a tax case and another appendix setting forth filled in specimen
returns, which should help the student to visualize the problems with which
he is dealing.
Professor Bruton's second edition reflects the growth of a serious scholar
through experience in teaching a difficult course. It is a decidedly better book
than the first edition and a thoroughly competent and workmanlike job.
CHuL1s L. B. LOWNDUS.
Duke University.
ox PlOPERTy. By A. James Casner and W. Barton Leach. Revised Temporary Edition. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc.,
1948. Pp. xviii, 1086. $8.50.
In their Preface to this edition Casner and Leach say that their casebook
has the following objectives:
"(a) to give the first-year law student basic training in property law and
in the handling of legal materials generally;
"(b) to provide him with a practical grasp of the essentials of commercial
transactions in real estate."''
They refer also to Leach's article, "Property Law Taught in Two Packages," 2. and recommend that all students using the bookread the article. I
should put it more strongly: both students and teachers who use the book
ought to follow this recommendation. Reading of the article discloses,
among other things, that the authors' "Final objective is to see that the
course and the subject interest the student as they interest us. . . . If
there is any rule that requires a property course to be dull it is our aim to
CASES

violate it."3

There is no room for doubt that the authors have violated the putative
rule: it would take considerable skill to give a dull course out of the book.
The wild animal cases, with which the book starts, are always interesting to
students, and the authors have continued throughout the .selection of cases to
choose sets of facts which raise interesting human, as well as legal, problems.
The well-known predilections of the authors insure that the introductory and
explanatory notes could not be cast in the prosy language which we who
teach the law of property are all too prone to use, especially when we are dealing with common-law conveyancing. For example: "But A could not create a remainder after a fee simple determinable ...
Why not? Well,
1 Preface

vii.
2I J.LEGAL ED. 28 (1948).
SId. at 42.
2 JOURNAL OF Li,GAL Eo.N0.1
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just because there couldn't be, and stop asking impertinent questions."' - "But
you must become accustomed to learning that we in America adhere to
English anomalies and anacronisms long after the British have thrown them
down the drain." 5
Leach and Casner have sent out for the reviewers of the book statements
of various changes which they envisage for the permanent edition (not to be
published until the fall of 1950). One of the statements is to the effect that
Leach "plans 'to tone down' some of the comments and quips because he
thinks he may have rather overdone it." I hope that this change will not be
made. We all know that it is difficult to interest a large proportion of a class
in this subject, except as a chore which must be done. Any lightening of this
burden is welcome. I should like to have the authors go even further and
insert illustrations, as did Chafee and Simpson in their Equity casebook. The
problem of the chimney sweeper's boy has been vivid to me ever since I saw
a cartoon hanging in Langdell Hall.
The book does a good job with respect to objective "(a)"-namely, to give
basic training in the law of property and in the handling of legal materials.
The concept of possession is developed, in the traditional, way, through the
wild animal cases ranging "from a petulant sportsman's row over a fox on
Long Island

.

.

.

to the claims of rival groups of Cornish fishermen

to 2,000,000 herring in the Bay of St. Ives. .
"
It proceeds
through types of possession, including that of unconscious possessors-finders and persons who know that they control something but don't know what
the thing is-of adverse possessors and involuntary bailees, to the remedies
of possessors. This material on possession covers seventy-nine pages.
Part II covers gifts, both inter vivos and causa mortis, and is allotted seventy-two pages. Leach says, in his aforementioned article, that this subject
may be postponed to the second year. I hope not. As he says, the subject
is of moderate difficulty and helps to show the insubstantiality of the concept of possession as a means of solving problems. While it is true that a
study of gifts is a little incongruous in a course devoted to teaching something about commercial transactions, it is also true (as Leach points out)
that it has value in introducing estate and gift taxation and permits of contrasts with the later developed bi-lateral transactions. I should add:
it lets the student see the attempts of courts to carry the concept of possession, which was of the greatest importance in the older law, over into the
modem approach to property problems. Surely it is well for students to see
early in their career the weight of history and judicial habits of thought.
Parts III and IV, covering a total of some three hundred pages, are devoted to bona fide purchase (BFP of personal property-sixty pages; of
real property-two hundred and thirty-six pages). Part IV (BFP of real
property) begins, following a short introductory note, with a twenty-four
page statement by a Massachusetts conveyancer on the mechanics of title
search in Massachusetts. This statement is clear and very helpful: it should
save some hours of lecture and seems to me one of the valuable features of
the book. A recent letter from Casner is to the effect that the final edition
P. 733.
5P. 736.
6 P. 1.
4
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will contain comments by leading conveyancers on this statement, designed
to point out differences in practices. This is to be done partly with the hope
that students will get some feeling of the peculiar localization of land conveyancing, and of the fact that it is, nevertheless, based to a considerable
extent on practices common in various states.
This should be a helpful addition. It may help indirectly in the effort
to teach the student that the common law is a chimera and that what we
have is as many common laws as there are states living under the general
system. It is to be hoped, moreover, that Casner and Leach will be able to
find conveyancers in the other states whose style is as interesting as that of
Richard B. Johnson who wrote the "Massachusetts" statement. He has
some Leachy characteristics in his style. He makes very vivid the problem
of the searcher who must ignore the "specter of estoppel by deed," because,
if he searches under each name in the chain of title, "The cost of each examination would exceed the value of the land."
After this statement of the mechanics of title search come chapters on
the "Significance of Failure to Record," "Record Notice," "Inquiry Notice,"
and "When a Person is a Purchaser for a Valuable Consideration." Some
may object that formal categorization of the components of a problem do
violence to the ideal "Spartan Education." I have heard criticisms of this
nature, but cannot agree. Legal education is Spartan enough anyway, and
the student can profit from a pointed and comprehensible chapter or section title printed at the top of each page.
Chapters V, VI, and VII of Part IV continue "the presentation of protection given the BFP, through covenants for title, title insurance, and registered titles. I am not sure that the latter two subjects could not be more
helpfully covered for the purposes of students in most states by text notes,
rather than by cases. A large proportion of contemplated purchases of land
cannot get either type of protection. Casner and Leach list only sixteen
that, even in these
states in which Torrens Acts have been enacted and say
7
states, voluntary registration has proceeded very slowly.
Part V covers estates in land, including common law estates both several
and concurrent, the executory interests made possible by the Statutes of
Uses and of Wills, and landlord and tenant; of the total of two hundred and
seventy-five pages given to this Part, only fifty-five pages are given to estates and nineteen pages to the effects of the Statutes. These few pages
contain specially prepared text on the subjects of common law estates, common law conveyancing, and the effect of the two Statutes, with interspersed
problems. Leach says, in his article, in the first issue of the Journal of
Legal Education, that this presentation of these matters in the casebook is
due to the fact that much too much time has been given to the historical development of the law of real property in the various law schools. He asks
why the historical material should not be put in six pages, in which compass,
he says, there could be put what any lawyer needs to know so far as 99.9
per cent of his practice is concerned, but Leach says also that his present
judgment is that this would be a mistake. His reasons seem to be: (1)
that "our young men

.

.

. must have depth

.

.

.

and one aspect of

depth is perspective, an understanding of how and why the law came to be
7 P. 417.
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as it is"; and (2) "Then again there is the form of snobbishness we call
. it may be that a few decades hence it will be mere pedantry
culture .
to know that Coke was not pronounced as it is spelled, that the judicial protection of wardships and marriages left significant traces in our land law.
. . . But my judgment is that things of this type and in this period still
comprise the common professional culture of educated lawyers." 8
It may well be that we are in a stage of transition, between that time when
a knowledge of Coke on Littleton and Blackstone's Commentaries was essential and the time when that knowledge will be a purely snobbish culture.
If so, Leach and Casner have hit about the happy medium. I wonder, however, whether they are not leaning too heavily on the presence of cultural
offerings in the rest of the Harvard curriculum. P'ew of the smaller schools
can afford formal courses in Jurisprudence and the History of the CommonLaw.
Should not every student, somewhere in his caredr in law school, thoroughly be exposed to a demonstration of the force of history in the development of the common law? Do we not all find our students all too prone to
look on the law as a fully developed phenomenon, with little or no consciousness of the struggle to climb from the requirements of the comparatively
simpler ages to the needs of our comparatively complicated legal civilization?
Is there any place in the whole course of study which is as well adapted to
the development of this consciousness as the law of real property? Some
of the job can be done in the course in Procedure, if it includes a fairly detailed study of the development of the forms of action in their substantive
function. But the connection between the formulary system and modern
procedure seems much less close than that between the early law of conveyancing and the modem law in the same field. Our courts seem, today, much
more loth to cast off the shackles of the old law of property than those of
the old law of pleading-witness the narrow construction of many statutes
enacted to abolish the rule in Shelley's Case. We have a better chance of
convincing our students that the study of the history of the law of conveyancing has a bread-and-butter value than of convincing them that there is
such value in the study of the formulary system; and we all know how
students search for bread-and-butter study. Perhaps we should not cater to
this search, but I cannot help feeling that we might well take advantage of
it; that we must somehow give the student an idea of the effect of history;
and that we can best do so in a course in which history is, if not, alive and
kicking, yet alive. Leach does say that, since examinations have not yet
(as of the time of his article) been given in a course taught from the casebook, he and Casner have only guesses as to the effectiveness of the presentation, but that these guesses are hopeful.9
This is the only part of the book with which I have a serious quarrel. It
may be that these "hopeful" guesses have proven themselves. Even if they
have, I still feel that in this particular connection Leach correctly said,
melior est petere fontes quam sectare rivulos.' It seems to me that this
material will need supplementation by assignments of parts of Blackstone.
8 Supra note 2, at 46.
9 Id. at 45.
10 Id. at 46.
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Part VII consideri (in one hundred and twenty-two pages) the various
methods of controlling the use of land, through legislation and by covenants. The constitutionality 'of the racial restrictive covenants and ordinances is covered by Buchanan v. Warley and the recent cases of Shelley ,.
Kraemer and Hurd v. Hodge, which fortunately were decided in time to be
put in the casebook. Zoning is covered in the Euclid and Nectow cases, the
problems peculiar to mining in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon.
.Problems raised by covenants get full coverage through the printing of many
of the historic cases and a generous number of modem cases.
The part of the casebook covering easements (seventy pages) contains
largely quite recent cases: Arnold z. Fee and Boatman r. Lasley are the
two old friends. The selection of the new cases, however, largely makes
up-for the lack of the familiar ones. The opinions discuss the history of
the problems and their solutions, and.the facts bring modern problems to the
fore.
In so far as lateral support is concerned, the chapter on "Lateral and Subjacent Support" offers an excellent basis for discussion of the foundational
principles and raises all the problems which now come to mind. There is
no case, however, on subjacent support and no indication that any of the
cases cited in the problems touch that matter. Noonan v.Pardee is cited
in the last problem I' but without any indication that it concerns the subject.
It may be that cases which contain untenable analyses are better left out of
a casebook like this one. I feel, however, that the struggles of the Pennsylvania court to harmonize the interrelated claims of the surface owners
and the mining companies are entitled to a place in the book, and would
like to see one of the cases which enunciates that court's peculiar "three
estate" doctrine printed in the final edition. It is true that subjacent support
is not a problem which touches as large a part of the country as does lateral
support, but the desirable solutions may be different and seem to merit
some, discussion in a casebook which is offered for general use in American
law schools.
In the Introductory Note to the chapter on water rights the authors advise the student to consider the different considerations which may be involved when navigable and non-navigable streams are involved and say, "Do
not overlook the relevance of the date of a case." The different considerations involved in problems concerning the two kinds of streams are vividly
presented by the opinion in the recent case of United States v. Willow River
Power Company, decided in 1945. In the cases concerning non-navigable
streams, however, there is no indication that the date is relevant: the earliest
of these cases was decided in 1897 and the latest in 1913. The importance
of the date of the case is well brought out by the one case printed in the
section on underground water. In Meeker v. City of East Orange the step
from Acton v. Blundell to the preferable modem rule is made vivid by the
opinion. In the Meeker case the proof of deprivation by the defendant was
comparatively simple. The final edition might be made more useful by the
inclusion of a problem on a solution of the difficulties of proof in an underground water case that the defendant's activities were the causelof the plaintiff's deprivation.
l P. 979.
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The last chapter in the book, covering invasion of air space, contains only
United States v. Causby, which is, perhaps, the ideal case if no more space is
to be allotted to this subject. Here again, I feel that some survey of the
history of the problems, some presentation of the usque ad coelun idea,
should be made by cases or by text, and that the Hinnan 1.2 case should
appear as an example of the nuisance approach, particularly because of the
queer notion therein expressed to the effect that the ownership doctrine necessarily leads to undesirable results.
The cases in this book are followed by some fifty pages of appendices
which should be very helpful: an "A-B-C of Taxes' for Property Lawyers,"
including outlines of federal income taxation, federal and state gift, estate
and inheritance taxation, and municipal property taxation; a short but informative outline of various types of insurance; and the "Regulations for
the Preparation of Title Evidence in Land Acquisition by the United States."
There is to be added to these another appendix explaining the various types
of security transactions. These should conduce to the more realistic approach to property problems which Leach says, in his article, is one of the
aims of the casebook.
While it is certain that the authors have done a fine job with respect to.
their objective (a), which is quoted at the beginning of this review, it is impossible to have comparative certainty about their objective (b), until some
experience with the book has tested it. The cases seem clearly to have been
selected with the practicality of the problems therein considered well in mind,
and the above-mentioned appendices should add to this emphasis on practicality.
If it is necessary to cut down the number of hours allotted to the property
courses, it is hard to quarrel with any selection of omissions. I find myself
a little disturbed, however, by the cursory treatment of estates and conveyancing under the common law and the great English statutes, which I
spoke of earlier, and by the virtual lack of materials on fixtures. It may be
that, in other states, problems of fixtures as between vendor and vendee, and
mortgagor, mortgagee, and conditional vendee, are not so important. In
Pennsylvania, the books are full of litigation in this field and I have found
no dearth of controversies on the subject in some other states. Some supplementation by a considerable body of mimeographed materials on fixtures
may prove almost necessary.
It seems to be somewhat customary to close a book review with references
to the index and to typographical errors. I cannot refer to the former because this temporary edition does not contain any, and I cannot be nasty
about the latter because my reading disclosed only two very unimportant
errors.
CJARLES W. TAJNTOR II.
University of Pittsburgh.
12 Binman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755 (C.C.A.9th 1936).

